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1 Richard C. Bush, former Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and staff
member  on  the  House  International  Relations  Committee,  has  published  an
extraordinary collection of  essays on US-Taiwan relations.  In so doing,  Bush shares
with readers a rare depth of knowledge and insightful policy perspective. While each
essay stands on its own, one will miss a great deal by not taking in the entire anthology
of highly readable pieces.
2 Bush covers a wide range of topics that include an original exploration of President
Franklin  D.  Roosevelt’s  wartime decision to  return Taiwan to  China ;  the  American
dilemma in dealing with Kuomintang (KMT) repression starting in the mid-1940s along
with a unique look at the interaction between Congress and the Taiwanese-American
community  in  later  years  on  the  issue  of  human  and  political  rights ;  a  nuanced
discussion of the twin issues of the status of Taiwan and the status of the Republic of
China (ROC) ; an examination of the “sacred texts” in the US “one China” policy ; and
some  observations  on  the  difficulties  of  navigating  the  post-Tiananmen  waters  in
Taiwan policy.
3 One unavoidable drawback is that some essays were drafted as much as eight years ago.
A  fair  amount of  new  material  has  been  declassified  since  then,  especially  on
negotiations over the three US-PRC joint communiqués. Even so, Bush’s insights are
based primarily on a deep probing of the historical record, extensive interviews with
direct  participants  in  events  he  discusses,  and  his  own  experience,  especially  in
Congress.  These will  not change,  and he presents fresh material  of  great value and
interest to anyone concerned with US Taiwan policy1. 
4 Bush’s  discussion  of  sovereignty  takes  us  back  to  the  early  1940s.  He  notes  how
Roosevelt personally set US policy for both historical and strategic reasons, taking due
account of the important role of Madame Chiang Kai-shek. He concludes that Roosevelt
made  his  own  decisions  independent  of  the  advice  he  received  and  largely  in  the
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context of his vision for the post-war world rather than, as some have argued, from a
desire to hold China in the war.
5 Bush notes that, although the changing circumstances in Taiwan and the region after
World War II led the United States to pull back from Roosevelt’s vision of returning
Taiwan formally to “China”,  in many other ways American Taiwan policy has been
quite  consistent.  He  documents,  for  example,  that  General  Douglas  MacArthur’s
authorisation to the Chinese Nationalists to accept the Japanese surrender on Taiwan
was not authorisation for China to resume sovereignty ; some legal act had to follow.
Although both Taipei (and later Peking) rejected this position, it remained the view
from Washington, as well as London.
6 Bush argues that consideration of trusteeship for Taiwan in the late 1940s stemmed
from the desire to deny Taiwan to the Communists for security reasons, not out of
concern to promote popular sovereignty. That said, his detailed and well-documented
discussion of American reactions to the “2/28 (1947) Incident” vividly demonstrates the
considerable complexity in American thinking, including growing qualms about forcing
people in Taiwan to accept not just Communist rule, but also a repressive KMT regime.
Although, as Bush notes, American options were actually quite limited, his account is a
useful reminder of the post-1947 history that is very much a part of the Taiwan psyche,
even if unknown or unremembered by people elsewhere.
7 It is clear that the US decision in late 1949/early 1950 not to become embroiled in the
Chinese civil war was coloured by the belief the Communists would take over the island
by the end of 1950, and the judgement that stopping it was not worth a conflict with
the newly established People’s Republic of China.  The Korean War six months later
changed all that, of course. 
8 Bush is especially effective in documenting both the strategic factors and the relevance
of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s “Who lost China ?” campaign to the US inability to press
the KMT to reform in the 1950s and 1960s. He describes as “realistic” the American
circumspection  in  urging  a  reformist  agenda  on  the  Taipei  government,  but  his
frustration at the limited effect of US efforts is plainly evident. In discussing this period
as well as later efforts to generate attention to human rights abuses in Taiwan, Bush
brings  to  life  the  role  of  individual  Taiwanese—and the  American response—in the
burgeoning of Taiwan independence movements abroad. 
9 Bush’s  chapter  on the status  of  the island of  Taiwan,  on the one hand,  and of  the
political entity known as the Republic of China, on the other, is especially useful in
distinguishing between these two issues. This is not often done. At one point, Bush says
that  the  Truman/Acheson  statements  of  early  January  1950  “made  clear”  US
acceptance of Taiwan as a part of China. But the statements he cites could be more
accurately read as saying that, although no such legal determination had been made, the
United States was not going to get involved in the final stages of the Chinese civil war.
Moreover, as Bush observes, with the Korean War under way, Truman’s statement of
June 27th 1950, once again underscored that the United States did not consider that the
island’s sovereignty had been determined. 
10 A consistent dual theme has run through American Taiwan policy ever since : that the
issue should not be resolved through the use of force but neither should the island be
turned over to a Communist  regime without an effort  to determine the will  of  the
people of Taiwan. Of course, by the 1960s and 1970s, a countervailing consideration was
the desire—originally—not to foreclose and—later—to foster good US relations with the
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PRC.  This  included,  Bush  notes,  fashioning  a  policy  that  avoided  giving  the  PRC
justification  or  provocation  for  seizing  Taiwan—for  example,  by  backing  a  legally
separate, independent state.
11 Although  domestic  American  political  developments  after  1952  generated  greater
support  for  the  ROC’s  diplomatic  status,  Bush  shows  how  the  United  States  was
concerned  then,  as  later—albeit  in  quite  different  circumstances—to  avoid  a
commitment to defend Taiwan against a PRC attack that Taipei had provoked. And by
the mid-1950s, people were actively looking for ways to mitigate the danger of cross-
Strait war. In the ambassadorial “Warsaw Talks” with Peking, Washington sought to
achieve  this  through  a  mutual  renunciation  of  force.  Bush  judges  that  this  effort
“almost succeeded,” but this seems unlikely, as Peking was assiduous in avoiding any
such commitment regarding the “internal” affairs of Taiwan.
12 The US approach in these talks, Bush notes, was pragmatic, treating China as a “divided
country,”  in  essence  “one  China,  two  governments”—one  of  which  (the  ROC)
Washington dealt with on a de jure basis, and the other (the PRC) on a de facto basis.
Moreover, Bush effectively documents that, contrary to popular notions, John Foster
Dulles’s objection to PRC UN membership was not ideological but rather grounded in
doubts about “its ability to govern China without serious domestic resistance.” 
13 Bush speculates that if Chiang Kai-shek had supported “dual representation” of China
in the United Nations, Taiwan might still be represented there. Once again, however,
there is nothing in the history of PRC approaches to suggest it would have accepted
this, or that Peking would not have eventually succeeded in replacing Taipei.
14 In approaching the US-PRC rapprochement, Bush notes that the United States has been
careful not to endorse unification as the ultimate goal (though Dulles did so at one
point, he observes, and over the years various presidents have haphazardly endorsed
the existence of “one China”). According to his research, the United States has never
directly challenged Taipei’s claim that the ROC is a “state.” But not only did Secretary
of  State  Colin  Powell  subsequently  do  so  publicly  in  Peking  in  October  2004,  but
rejection of Taipei’s statehood claim is fully implicit in the severance of relations with
the ROC in 1979 and establishment of diplomatic ties with the PRC, recognising the PRC
government as the “sole legal government of China.”
15 Bush is correct in his inference that such recognition did not encompass recognition of
the Peking government as the legal government of Taiwan—a fact the PRC occasionally
glosses  over.  But  US refusal  to  support  ROC  membership  in  any  organisation  of
sovereign states, and the lack of American diplomatic or official relations with Taipei,
as well as Powell’s October 2004 statements, all show that, while it generally avoids
confronting this issue directly, the United States does not consider the ROC to be a
sovereign, independent state. 
16 Bush  examines  in  great  detail  the  “sacred  texts”  of  US  China  policy  and  US-PRC
relations—the  Shanghai  Communiqué  issued  during  Nixon’s  1972  visit ;  the
Normalisation Communiqué establishing diplomatic relations as of January 1st 1979 ;
and the August 17th 1982 Communiqué, focusing mainly on US arms sales to Taiwan. He
observes ruefully that “hardly anyone reads the texts of these documents any more,
either  fully  or  carefully.”  He  also  notes  the  importance  of  ancillary  texts  and
statements to gleaning the full meaning of the “three joint communiqués.” 
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17 Bush helpfully places the relevant portions of various documents side by side, so one
can  see  graphically  how  any  particular  issue  was  handled  in  each  communiqué,
whether in the formal text, in a side statement, or in some other way. He notes how
“sticky” issues were divided between communiqué text and ancillary statements (much
as  sensitive  Taiwan  issues  were  handled  during  the  state  visit  of  Jiang  Zemin  to
Washington in October 1997). 
18 Bush  believes  the  United  States  yielded  too  much  to  Peking  in  the  various
communiqués, especially regarding peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. But with
the advantage we now have of access to much of the actual negotiating record (an
advantage  Bush  lacked  when  he  was  writing),  it  is  clear  that  at  the  time  of
normalisation, while willing to avoid public confrontation, the U.S. was unambiguous in
insisting that Peking forego the use of force against Taiwan. 
19 Taking full advantage of his congressional expertise, Bush makes a persuasive case that
the  extensive  textual  changes  Congress  made  in  spring  1979  to  the  draft  Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA), while rhetorically robust, were not as substantively meaningful as
is often argued, and that much TRA language falls short of constituting an obligation.
Bush’s fine-grained discussion of security aspects of the TRA is an invaluable guide to
understanding what is  policy,  what is  a  commitment,  and what is  an expression of
concern—and, of critical importance, what processes are required before acting.
20 Bush notes the PRC fixation on US statements in the three joint communiqués to the
virtual  exclusion  of  other  documents  and  statements.  But  this  is  understandable,
because  they are  the  only  negotiated statements  between the two governments  on
these matters, and other statements or even documents (e.g., presidential letters) can
be rejected not only by the next administration but even by the one that issued them. 
21 In his examination of how the United States treated human rights violations in Taiwan
in later years, mainly in the 1980s, Bush again draws deeply on extensive interviews
and  on  his  congressional  experience,  including  his  exposure  to  the  Taiwanese-
American community and the interaction between that community and Members. His
presentation is truly a tour de force that does not pull any punches in describing the role
of  politics  and  financial  contributions  to  Congress  from  the  Taiwanese-American
community.
22 In  his  final  chapter,  covering  policymaking  since  Tiananmen,  Bush  observes  that
Peking rejects yi  zhong,  ge biao (one China, respective interpretations) as a basis for
cross-Strait dialogue. The PRC has previously turned away from that formulation on
the grounds that Taiwan’s former president, Lee Teng-hui, twisted the original point
that both sides held in common the view that there was “one China” and reunification
was the ultimate goal, instead promoting “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan.”
There are signs, however, that, were a Taiwan leader to accept “one China,” there need
not be agreement on the definition in order to resume dialogue—and perhaps achieve a
great deal more—and that yi zhong, ge biao would indeed be an acceptable approach.
Given KMT Chairman Lien Chan’s embrace of that position while in Peking in April
2005, this is again a live issue. 
23 Bush also reminds us that  creating a political  framework for managing cross-Strait
relations short of unification, under discussion these days, is not a new idea ; it was
very much part of the US position in the mid-1990s. The problem then, as now, was that
such a framework was elusive in light of the increasingly conflicting goals of the two
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sides. Although both wanted to avoid confrontation and war, neither was willing to
commit formally to such restraint because it seemed to encompass too great a sacrifice
of “principle.”
24 Bush raises the critical point that, while it is theoretically possible to imagine a long-
term resolution unrelated to some concept of “one China,” in fact this seems highly
unrealistic. Moreover, he suggests there are certain concepts of “one China” that would
not only preserve full autonomy for Taiwan but that could also incorporate aspects of
true sovereignty. 
25 While that is not possible under current circumstances, if Peking truly wants peaceful
reunification, it has a strong incentive to think more creatively about its own definition
of “one China”—eventually moving away from the “one country, two systems” concept,
which  is  unacceptable  in  Taiwan  precisely  because  it  presumes  a  single,  unified
sovereignty under the aegis of a government in Peking. The PRC’s omission of “one
country, two systems” from the March 2005 “Anti-Secession Law” may be a sign that
Peking is beginning to consider how to square its own bottom line on “one China” with
Taiwan’s on self-determination.
26 The PRC’s goal of formal reunification is obviously a long-term one, unrealisable within
decades if not longer. The more pertinent task for the medium term—the timeframe
that  is  relevant  to  policymaking  in  all  three  capitals—is  how  to  avoid  crises  and
promote positive relations.
27 To succeed in that task, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of how we got
where  we  are.  Richard  Bush’s  book  goes  a  long  way  to  helping  us  gain  that
understanding.
NOTES
1. If Bush produces a second edition, one hopes he might rethink his decision to use the
PRC’s pinyin romanisation system even for Taiwan figures, who do not use that system. 
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